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The future of secure communication networks relies on the secure distribution of symmetric encryption keys. 
Current methods of distributing keys are either vulnerable (public key encryption has the capability of being cracked 
with quantum computers) or are expensive (couriers physically delivering keys to remote locations).  The most 
secure method is to distribute keys from small satellites using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).  
S15 Space Systems is a spin-off company that is developing space-based, quantum-safe communications built on 
research performed at the Centre for Quantum Technologies (CQT) at the National University of Singapore. The 
team is developing technologies such as QKD which harness unique properties of quantum physics to enable highly 
secured encryption services. QKD can generate encryption keys that are secure against computational hacks and that 
can be distributed to remote parties with solid guarantees that they have not been intercepted by man-in-the-middle 
eavesdroppers. Quantum light source hardware is being developed that fits on a 3U CubeSat, and a small 
constellation of these satellites can effectively service thousands of users. 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently, most encryption keys derive their security 
from complex mathematical functions that require 
unfeasibly large classical computers to crack, but 
quantum computers are coming online soon that will 
compromise many of these keys. Since QKD derives its 
security from symmetric keys that are fundamentally 
random and fundamentally private it is provably secure 
against future computational developments. QKD 
requires that information be transmitted optically, 
typically with bits encoded in individual photons that 
must be uniquely distinguished and timestamped at the 
transmitter and receiver. Accordingly the signals are 
very weak and susceptible to loss compared with 
classical laser communications. Within optical fibers 
they are restricted to distances of 50-100km before 
physically secured, trusted repeater stations are 
required. Using free-space optics the losses are lower 
and by delivering QKD from space the entire world can 
be connected securely. 
With today’s existing network, communications 
between two distant parties (called Alice and Bob in 
typical cryptography parlance) can be easily intercepted 
by an unwanted third party (also known as Eve, short 
for eavesdropper). To thwart Eve, Alice and Bob 
encrypt their sensitive message with a symmetric 
encryption key that only they know (symmetric because 
the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the 
message). Eve can intercept the encrypted message, but 
can’t decrypt it – not yet, anyway.  
Because Alice and Bob need a new key for each 
message, they rely on public key encryption (PKE) for 
the efficient distribution of keys. PKE uses public-
private key pairs consisting of a public key that is 
available to everybody, and a private key that is buried 
in the public key. The public key is designed as a trap-
door function: it is easily created from the private key, 
but the private key cannot be easily found from the 
public key. An example of a trap-door function 
commonly used for PKE is multiplication of two large 
prime numbers to create a third, larger, non-prime 
number. Once you know this large number, it is 
incredibly hard to factor out the two prime numbers.  
Eve can intercept Alice and Bob’s public key but 
cannot extract their private key. But quantum 
computers, new algorithms and sudden unexpected 
advances in classical computing capabilities could give 
Eve the capability to crack PKE.1 
But a new system is necessary that utilizes secure 
channels that cannot be intercepted for key delivery. It 
should be noted that keys are not actually delivered in 
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QKD – they are created as part of the QKD process. 
This is more secure than existing systems where keys 
are delivered across the open network, making them 
susceptible to interception.  
These encryption keys can then safely encrypt and 
decrypt messages that are sent over normal 
communications channels.  
TYPES OF QKD 
There are different types QKD that mainly stem from 
two principles: Prepare-and-Measure, and 
Entanglement. The former exploits quantum 
indeterminacy to prevent an eavesdropper from 
measuring the quantum state of the photon (which 
encodes the bit of information) without changing it. In 
the latter, two photons are linked (entangled) such that 
measuring the state of one photon affects the state of 
the other. 
Prepare-and-Measure Protocols 
The foundational Prepare-and-Measure protocol is 
known as BB84, after the paper written by Charles 
Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984.2 It relies on the 
uncertainty principle, where the act of measuring a 
photon’s polarization is an integral part of quantum 
mechanics, not just a passive, external process, as in 
classical physics. In this scheme, the transmitting party, 
Alice, encodes the bits of the encryption key through 
the polarization of individual photons. Alice sends these 
photons to the receiver, Bob, through a weak coherent 
pulse that is generated with specially modified lasers. 
Bob receives these photons, measures the polarization 
states, and, after protocol checks with Alice, verifies 
they both have the same unique, random, encryption 
key. These checks (parameter estimation, error 
correction, and privacy amplification) are performed 
over a normal (but authenticated) communications 
channel.  
Eve may be sitting outside of Bob’s compound and 
receive the same photons but has to guess at the 
polarization to measure (either linear or diagonal). Only 
Alice and Bob know the correct polarization to measure 
and the measurement results and will quickly discover 
and discard any key that has been compromised by Eve.  
Prepare-and-Measure QKD has been demonstrated with 
laser hardware that emits pulses at such a low power 
that very small numbers of photons (ideally, one) are 
sent per pulse. Because of this, Prepare-and-Measure 
QKD is also known as weak coherent pulse QKD.  
Entanglement-based Protocol 
The first Entanglement-based protocol, known as E91 
after the 1991 Artur Ekert paper, takes advantage of 
entanglement.3 Pairs of entangled photons are created 
and sent to Alice and Bob, who measure their correlated 
polarizations. If Eve intercepts one of the pairs, the 
entanglement is broken, introducing errors and making 
Eve’s presence detectable.  
In contrast to Prepare-and-Measure schemes, there is no 
active choice required when encoding states into the 
photons. Instead, both parties are recipients who share a 
source of maximally entangled photon pairs, the 
generation of which is a truly random process. Typical 
implementations utilize photon pairs entangled in the 
polarization degree of freedom, and the photon pair is 
split such that one photon is transmitted to Alice, while 
its twin is transmitted to Bob. Both parties make 
independent measurement choices on the photons and 
decide to measure them in either the diagonal or 
horizontal basis. Alice and Bob still need to perform 
clear channel checks in the same manner as in the 
Prepare-and-Measure protocol. However, no random 
number generators are required to prepare the source, 
and the measurement devices for Alice and Bob are 
identical.  
QKD FROM A CUBESAT 
QKD Hardware 
S15 Space’s primary QKD system uses an entangled-
photon quantum light source based on the flight-proven 
small photon entangling system (SPEQS) developed at 
CQT. SPEQS was designed as a compact and rugged 
package to generate and analyze photon-pairs produced 
using Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion 
(SPDC). The SPEQS package contains a laser and 
crystals, which produce the photon pairs, as well as 
single photon detectors with polarization analyzers to 
detect them.4  
This SPEQS design has heritage from the on-orbit 
demonstration on the Galassia mission in 2016, high-
altitude demonstrations in 2012 and 2014, and lab and 
long-distance terrestrial demonstrations over a decade 
ago. A summary of this heritage is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Quantum light source heritage from CQT 
Year Mission 
2012 Basic miniature spontaneous 
parametric down-conversion 
(SPDC) source demonstrated 
by high-altitude balloon.5 
 
2013 Correlated SPDC pair source 
demonstrated by high-altitude 
balloon.6 
 
2014 Space-qualified, correlated, 
SPDC source launched on 
GomX-2, survived launch 
failure.7 
 
2016 Space-qualified, correlated, 





Demonstration of entangled 
photon pair source in space on 
SpooQySat CubeSat.10 
 
Each successive mission gradually raises the 
technology readiness level of the photon pair sources. 
Initial iterations developed the miniaturized electronics 
and ruggedized optics. These led onto on-orbit tests of a 
correlate photon pair source, producing photons that are 
not entangled in polarization but may have 
entanglement in other degrees of freedom (e.g. time-
frequency).Error! Reference source not found. 
The most advanced SPEQS design is slated for launch 
on the SpooQySat CubeSat in late 2018.9 This 
polarization entangled version of SPEQS features a 
custom isostatic and thermally isolating mounting 
system to try and reduce the performance variation of 
the device. The engineering model of SpooQy-1 with a 
structural model SPEQS payload is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Engineering model of SpooQySat with 
structural model SPEQS Payload (panels removed 
for display purposes) 
Follow-on CubeSats will further establish the space 
worthiness of the source and beam photons out of the 
satellite to perform QKD. The next mission is planned 
for a launch on a CubeSat in 2020 and should 
demonstrate satellite-to-ground entanglement 
distribution and QKD.  
Concept of Operations 
QKD is most useful to ensure secure communications 
between two distant ground stations. A CubeSat 
operating in a LEO orbit doesn’t typically have a 
simultaneous view of two distant ground stations at the 
same time. So the trusted node QKD method is used.  
The CubeSat first distributes keys between the satellite 
and each ground station in turn. Then by using a 
mathematical operator within the satellite (which knows 
both keys), both ground stations will get symmetric 
keys. This protocol requires that the satellite knows 
both keys, which means the satellite must be trusted to 
be secure by ground stations; this is termed   a trusted 
node.  
The concept of operations for LEO trusted node QKD 
is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Trusted Node QKD ConOps (originally 
published in reference 11) 
Panel (a): Satellite passes over the first ground station 
(Station A) and establishes a shared secret key KA 
running the QKD protocol. 
Panel (b): Satellite passes over the second ground 
station (Station B) and establishes a shared secret key 
KB with running the QKD protocol. 
Panel (c): Satellite holds both keys (KA and KB), while 
Stations A and B knows only their own. Satellite 
publicly announces the parity of both keys KA ⊕ KB, 
which allows Station B to determine key KA 
Both Station A and Station B now have the shared 
symmetric encryption key KA, which can then be used 
to encrypt private communications between A and B. 
Keys generated through QKD are unique and random 
each time so there is no way to send KA directly to 
station by using QKD alone 
In principal, a single LEO satellite of this kind, in a 
polar orbit, can service the entire world, with revisit 
times and throughputs increased by launching 
additional satellites. This provides an economical way 
to roll out a QKD service, particularly for early 
adopters to this system. Even though the number of 
passes is irregular (maybe once a week, accounting for 
statistical cloud cover at both stations), many keys can 
be delivered per pass (depending on the size of the 
satellite and receivers). 
CONCLUSIONS 
A QKD satellite network deployed through CubeSats or 
other small satellites provides an important part of the 
future of secure communications. This technology is at 
sufficient technology readiness to ensure that a basic 
network can be deployed in the next five years, just in 
time to head off the vulnerabilities of existing key 
distribution systems.  
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